Womb at work: the missing impact of maternal employment on newborn health by Chuard, Caroline
  
 
 
 Working Paper No. 301  
 
Womb at Work:  
The Missing Impact of Maternal Employment  
on Newborn Health 
 
  Caroline Chuard 
   
October 2018 
 
 
 
 
   
University of Zurich  Department of Economics 
   
Working Paper Series   ISSN 1664-7041 (print) 
 ISSN 1664-705X (online)   
   
 
 
 
WOMB AT WORK: THE MISSING IMPACT OF MATERNAL
EMPLOYMENT ON NEWBORN HEALTH
Caroline Chuard∗
University of Zurich
This Version: October 2018
Abstract
Parental leave policies across the globe have become much more generous than they used to be.
This is also true for prenatal maternal leave. While this may be costly in the short run, little is
known about the effect of maternal employment during pregnancy on newborn health. In this
paper, I exploit three sharp policy changes on the duration of paid parental leave in Austria
that strongly affected the share of mothers who work up to the 32nd week of pregnancy. I use
administrative data from Austria on the working history of women linked to the full Austrian
birth register and coupled with a regression discontinuity framework to identify the effect of
prenatal employment on their offspring. Maternal employment during pregnancy with the
second child reacts strongly to these policy changes. The share of employed mothers sharply
declined in 1990 by 19.1 percentage points, increased in 1996 by 7.2 percentage points and
declined again by 6.4 percentage points in 2000. None of these changes in prenatal employment
translated into effects on newborn health measured via birth weight, gestational length, and
Apgar scores. This result holds true for mothers of different socioeconomic backgrounds and
across industries. The effect is precisely estimated, which suggests that prenatal employment
prior to the 32nd week of pregnancy does not causally affect the fetus for measures visible at
birth.
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JEL classification: I10; J13; J16.
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1 Introduction
Most high-income countries have seen a significant and steady increase in female labor force
participation over the last few decades. Therefore, women today are much more likely to work
while pregnant. At the same time, family policies have become much more generous since
the turn of the century with multifold goals such as gender equity, higher fertility, and better
child development (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017). One family policy instrument is prenatal
maternity leave intended to protect both the health of the mother and the newborn. The
duration of prenatal leave varies substantially - from 0 to 11 weeks - in European countries
(Jurviste et al., 2016). This variation across countries mirrors the uncertainty among policy
makers on how to optimally design such programs and concerning the role of maternal
leave. In the fetal origins hypothesis literature, several pregnancy conditions have already
been identified as key influencing factors on a variety of long-term outcomes of children.
If prenatal maternal employment is among them, long-term benefits for the children may
offset the costs of prenatal maternity leave. Therefore, understanding the effects of maternal
employment during pregnancy on newborn health is key for policy makers who design policies
concerning prenatal maternity leave.
There is a large body of literature estimating the effects of pregnancy conditions on
newborn health and long-term outcomes of children as summarized by Almond and Currie
(2011) and Almond et al. (2017). However, there is little evidence on the effect of prenatal
employment on newborn health. This is critical because the prenatal maternal employment
status combines several major aspects of pregnancy conditions such as stress, physical activ-
ity, disease environment, income, and others. In theory, the impact of prenatal employment
is ambiguous. On the one hand, maternal employment during pregnancy may be stressful for
the mother or may correlate with exposure to pollutants and diseases. These influences have
been shown to be detrimental to the unborn baby (Aizer et al., 2015; Currie and Schwandt,
2013, 2016; Schwandt, 2017). On the other hand, employment may also increase a mother’s
income or may be a joyful activity itself, which therefore could improve newborn health
(Almond et al., 2011; Hoynes et al., 2015).
This paper provides evidence on the effect of maternal employment during pregnancy on
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newborn health by exploiting three reforms in Austria that affected mothers’ likelihood of
working during pregnancy with their second child. These three reforms on the duration of
parental leave allow me to employ a regression discontinuity setting. In order to empirically
analyze the impact of prenatal maternal employment, I use administrative data from the
Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which contains the full work history for private-
sector employees. This data set can be linked to the Austrian Birth Register (ABR), which
covers all births with several indicators on newborn health and characteristics about mothers.
Parental leave policies in Austria consist of both a flat benefit and job protection. Be-
ginning in 1990, there have been several reforms affecting the duration of parental leave.
In 1990, parental leave was extended by one year, from 12 to 24 months. In 1996, this was
partially reversed to 18 months, but increased to 30 months in 2000. These changes led to an
easier automatic extension for another parental leave period upon the birth of an additional
child—the so called grace period rule. This rule exempts mothers from working and therefore
reduces a mother’s probability of working during pregnancy with the second child.
I find no evidence of prenatal employment effects on newborn health. This holds true
for a variety of outcomes measured via birth weight, gestational age, and Apgar scores.
Thus, I cannot reject that there are no effects of maternal employment during pregnancy on
newborn health, despite a very strong first stage. Across all policy reforms, the duration of
parental leave significantly affects the mother’s employment status during pregnancy with
her second child. The effect of the July 1990 reform, which increased parental leave by 12
months to 24 months, corresponds to a 19.1 percentage point decline in the share of mothers’
working during pregnancy. This effect is homogeneous over the entire first seven months of
a pregnancy. A heterogeneity analysis reveals marginally different, but always significant,
effects for a large set of subsamples stratified by a mother’s marital status, occupational
collar, and industry. However, I detected no significant effects on newborn health for any of
these subsamples.
Significantly, the study is based on a large administrative sample that allows me to pre-
cisely estimate the effects and to rule out sizeable newborn health effect-patterns. Further-
more, all covariates vary smoothly around the cutoffs of the policy reform, which supports the
interpretation of the regression discontinuity; the results are robust to a variety of different
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specifications. For example, I test for different birth weight and gestational age thresholds,
apply a Donut estimation to deal with delayed Caesarean sections, and implement a bounds
estimator to control for selection.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on pregnancy conditions on infant
health and specifically, on prenatal maternal employment on infant health.1 Wu¨st (2015)
employs Danish survey data in a regression analysis and finds positive effects for working
mothers with closely spaced consecutive births or those who change their employment status
due to educational reasons. Rossin (2011) analyzes the impact of unpaid maternity leave
provisions in the United States and documents small increases in birth weight and a reduction
in premature birth and infant mortality. Stearns (2015) studies time off from work during
late pregnancy under a temporary disability insurance program. She finds beneficial effects
for newborns of unmarried and black mothers. Ahammer et al. (2018) analyze a 1975 reform
in Austria that extended prenatal maternity leave from six to eight weeks. They find no
evidence for significant effects on newborn health.2
My paper adds to this literature in the following ways. It is the first to provide clear
evidence of the effect of maternal employment up to and including the seventh month of
a pregnancy on the health of the newborn. This setting, when combined with previous
literature that focused almost exclusively on the very end of a pregnancy, helps in under-
standing when in pregnancy time off might be most beneficial. Using the described reforms
for exogenous variation in prenatal maternal employment up to the 32nd pregnancy week
1This study also relates to the literature studying the effects of parental leave on other types of outcomes
such as maternal labor market outcomes, fertility, child and maternal health, and cognitive development of
children. In the Austrian context, Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) and Lalive et al. (2013), for example, study
the effect of the same reforms on maternal labor market outcomes and fertility, while Danzer and Lavy (2018)
and Danzer et al. (2017) focus on cognitive outcomes of the affected children. More broadly, there is a large
body of literature that studies the effect of post birth parental leave reforms on child development (Baker
and Milligan, 2008; Beuchert et al., 2016; Carneiro et al., 2015; Dahl et al., 2016; Danzer and Lavy, 2018;
Dustmann and Scho¨nberg, 2012; Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005; Rasmussen, 2010). Generally, the literature
concludes that introducing parental leave significantly improves child development in both the short and
long run while extensions in the duration of parental leave often do not lead to significant changes in child
development.
2A related study by Ginja et al. (2017) analyzes the effect of a speed premium in Sweden, analogous to
the grace period in Austria. In their study, the effect of maternal employment on newborn health is not
directly addressed. However, they document a slight decline in maternal employment during pregnancy with
the second child and no effects on outcomes measured at birth as a result of the speed premium. The effect
size of the analyzed policy reform on maternal employment is -0.013, substantially smaller than the 0.191 I
find.
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generates a large and representative sample of compliers. This complements the existing
literature on maternal employment during pregnancy on newborn health as I do not have to
rely on differential take-up of welfare programs by rich and white mothers (as in the context
of unpaid leave) or unmarried and black mothers (in the case of disability insurance). Fur-
thermore, I am able to use a large administrative data set on an individual basis that allows
me to exactly identify the exposed mothers and their offspring. Based on this data set, I
can calculate the exact number of days a mother is working during pregnancy. Significantly,
this allows me to analyze the impact of prenatal employment on two margins—the extensive
margin of mothers who choose to work or not during pregnancy and the intensive margin of
working mothers—as I can factor in unusually detailed information on maternal employment
histories. The richness of the data also makes it possible to analyze heterogeneous effects
across mothers and by work environment. Finally, in the Austrian context, the rich data
can be combined with a diverse policy setting. I explore the impact of prenatal employment
in three different points in time that allow me to both assess the effects of increases as well
as decreases in employment during pregnancy. Variation in both directions allows for study
of asymmetries in an already generous leave setting with strong changes in parental leave
duration across the studied time period.
Overall, my results show that large changes in prenatal employment do not imply sig-
nificant changes of newborn health. This suggests that parental leave policies should focus
on parental leave after the birth, given that time spent with parents especially in very early
childhood has been shown to be beneficial in a number of outcomes (Carneiro et al., 2015;
Rossin-Slater, 2017; Heckman, 2007).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the Austrian parental leave system
and the reforms used for this study. Section 3 develops a conceptual framework on how
prenatal maternal employment can affect newborn health. Section 4 discusses the data and
Section 5 presents the empirical strategy. Section 6 provides an overall assessment of the
results and sensitivity analyses, which will be discussed in Section 7. The paper concludes
in Section 8.
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2 The institutional setting
The Austrian family policy rules consist of two types of policies that cover the period around
birth. The first policy, mandatory maternity leave (ML), prohibits work 8 weeks pre- and
post-birth and pays the average wage a mother earned during the last quarter prior to giving
birth. As such, ML promises a generous environment in order to protect both the mother’s
and the baby’s health. After mandatory maternity leave expires, eligible mothers can choose
to take parental leave (PL). This second policy consists of two pillars: a flat benefit and job
protection. The policy changes that I will assess in this paper affect parental leave, which
will be explained in more detail below.
First-time mothers over the age of 25 are eligible for parental leave if they have worked for
at least 52 weeks within the 2 years prior to giving birth.3 The work requirement is reduced
to 20 weeks within the year prior to giving birth for higher-order births.4 Furthermore, there
is a grace period rule that allows mothers with relatively short birth spacing an automatic
extension for the next birth. More specifically, the grace period exempts mothers from the
work requirement if they give birth to an additional child no later than 3.5 months after the
expiration of the parental leave of the previous child.
Since 1990, there have been several reforms to the parental leave system; they are illus-
trated in Figure (1). Political debate about the introduction of paternal leave at the costs of
maternal leave led to the compromise of extending the duration of parental leave. Further-
more, in the early 1990s, formal child care institutions were scarce in Austria. This made
maternal employment during the child’s early years difficult and could possibly even deter
mothers from the labor market in the long run. Extending parental leave was expected to
improve this situation for mothers.
The reforms were structured as follows. While parental leave lasted up to the first
birthday of the child until June 1990, this was extended to 24 months after birth in July 1990.
The July 1996 reform, which targeted the cash benefits but left job protection unchanged,
reserved 6 of these added months for fathers. This effectively reduced the duration of parental
leave to 18 months after birth because almost no fathers were taking advantage of the leave.
3Work requirements are shorter for younger mothers.
4This is changed to 26 weeks after July 1996.
5
The July 2000 reform, which again only targeted cash transfers, increased parental leave
to 36 months after birth, reserving 6 months for fathers. Therefore, it essentially increased
parental leave from 18 to 30 months after birth.5
The changes in parental leave duration had strong implications for the likelihood that
mothers would give birth to another child within the grace period. Prior to June 1990, a
mother had to conceive the next child no later than 5.5 months after giving birth to her
first child in order to meet the requirements for automatic extension, which is biologically
difficult.6 The 1990 reform extended the window to conceive to 17.5 months; the July 1996
reform partially reversed it to 11.5 months, while the July 2000 reform extended it again to
23.5 months. All of these time windows are biologically feasible and desirable.7
Figure (A1) shows how the percentage of children born within parental leave and the
grace period has evolved over time. By construction, longer parental leave will lead to higher
fractions of second children born within this time period. Although prior to July 1990, only
10 percent of all second born were born within the period of parental leave extended by the
grace period, that number increased to around 40 percent for the period from July 1990 to
June 1996. In July 1996, there was a drop to 20 percent given the shorter parental leave
for these cohorts. The number increased again with the very generous parental leave system
established in July 2000.
Figure (2) exploits the discontinuities induced by the reforms and looks at pregnancies
with second children for mothers that gave birth to their first child each of the 2 years pre-
and post-policy reform. It shows that this simplification in meeting the requirements for the
grace period in July 1990 went hand in hand with fewer women working during pregnancy
with their second child. These effects are equally spread over the entire first 32 weeks of
pregnancy. Thereafter, mothers go on mandatory maternity leave and do not have to work
under either scheme. The decline in duration in July 1996 led to more women working during
5For further and more detailed information on the amount of cash benefits, eligibility criteria, announce-
ment of the policy reforms, and the reforms tehmselves, see Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) and Lalive et al.
(2013).
6Mothers who exclusively breastfeed have 98 percent protection from pregnancy in the first six months
(Kennedy et al., 1989).
7Short (often defined as less than 18 months) and very long (more than 59 months) interpregnancy
intervals are associated with adverse perinatal outcomes (see Conde-Agudelo et al. (2006) for a meta-analysis
on birth spacing).
6
the entire pregnancy, while the increase in duration in July 2000 again translated into fewer
women working during pregnancy with their second child.
3 Conceptual framework
Prenatal maternal employment may affect newborn health through various channels. While
several of these channels have each been analyzed individually in the previous literature,
the combined effect of prenatal employment on newborn health is not clear a priori. I next
describe each of these possible channels in more detail.
First, working itself could be stressful for the mother. Existing empirical literature on
the effects of maternal stress on infant health is generally limited to studying the effects
of very severe but often unique stress factors such as domestic violence (Aizer, 2011), hur-
ricanes (Currie and Rossin-Slater, 2013), political uprising (Lee, 2014), death of a relative
(Black et al., 2016; Persson and Rossin-Slater, 2018), and terrorism (Quintana-Domeque and
Ro´denas-Serrano, 2017; Camacho, 2008). Although all these studies show a negative impact
of these events on newborn health, the effects of milder stress, for example, stress induced by
work, are less clear. As recently summarized by Almond et al. (2017), relatively mild shocks
in early or prenatal life can, however, have substantial negative impact on child development.
Additionally, it is unclear whether mental and physical stress affect the fetus similarly and
whether these stresses might cause different effects when they are experienced early or late
in pregnancy.
Second, being on PL and therefore not working during pregnancy is also related to changes
in income. The intensity of this effect depends on a mother’s income. In fact, PL benefits are
flat over the entire PL and amount to roughly e340 per month.8 This translates into income
increase for low-income mothers and an income reduction for high-income mothers. However,
in the literature, the income effect on newborn health is almost exclusively identified for low-
income mothers. Hoynes et al. (2015), for example, show that the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) in the United States reduces the incidence of low birth weight and increases mean
8According to Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) this corresponds to a median net income replacement ratio
of more than 40 percent.
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birth weight. Almond et al. (2011) exploit monthly variation in the introduction of the Food
Stamp Program (FSP) in the United States and find positive effects for birth outcomes
especially at the lower tail of the birth weight distribution. Both papers focus on programs
designed for low-income people. Furthermore, evidence from conditional cash transfers in
developing countries also show a positive impact on several birth outcomes (Barber and
Gertler, 2008; Amarante et al., 2016). However, as PL benefits are flat and therefore only
negatively impact high-wage mothers, the effect of income in this setup is less clear. I will
investigate this issue in a heterogeneity analysis.
Third, working during pregnancy might expose the mother to pollutants and diseases
at work or while commuting. These influences have been shown to be negative for the
fetus (Almond, 2006; Schwandt, 2017; Currie et al., 2009; Currie and Schwandt, 2013, 2016).
Both Almond (2006) and Schwandt (2017) even show that flu exposure during pregnancy
has long-term effects on children’s educational attainment and wages.
Fourth, a side effect of the extension of the grace period could also be shorter birth
spacing between siblings. The medical literature argues that short spacing (most often
defined as less than 18 months in age difference) leads to adverse infant health outcomes
(see Conde-Agudelo et al. (2006) for a meta-analysis).
4 Data
This project is based on two administrative data sets. The primary source of data for the
determination of a mother’s work status during pregnancy is the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD). For the analysis of newborn health outcomes, I link the ASSD to the
Austrian Birth Register (ABR).
The Austrian Social Security Database. The ASSD stores the full work history of private-
sector employees and is used to verify pension claims. The ASSD also records the date of all
live births after entering the labor market and maternity and parental leave periods if taken.
As a result, I observe detailed information on a daily basis for each woman after her first
entry into the labor market. Detailed labor market information consists of the employer,
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along with information on occupation, experience, and tenure. Information on earnings is
provided per year and per employer.
The Austrian Birth Register. Information about newborn health measures is based on the
ABR, which includes all live births in Austria. Each birth entry consists of individual-level
information on birth characteristics such as date, place, gender, multiple births, gestational
length, birth weight, length, and Apgar scores. Furthermore, for every birth, maternal so-
cioeconomic characteristics such as age, educational attainment, marital status, and country
of origin complement the individual-level information.
I match the two sources of data based on characteristics I observe in both data sets,
such as the date of birth, the date of preceding birth for higher-order births, location of
birth, and age of the mother.9 For my main analysis, I restrict my sample to private sector
dependent employees who are PL eligible, aged 15–45, and who are giving birth to a single-
ton.10 Furthermore, I restrict my main sample to the period of 1984 to 2007, as gestational
length, one of my key variables, is only recorded after 1984. Altogether, this results in ap-
proximately 60,000 observed births per year out of a total of around 85,000 births in Austria.
Finally, I construct several variables that are key for my analysis. From all birth entries
per mother, I calculate the parity for every birth. Furthermore, I calculate the days a mother
has been working during pregnancy and based on this, I create a dummy for the work status,
defined as 1 if she worked a positive number of days during pregnancy.11
9This results in 61 percent of matches of all births in the birth register, corresponding to roughly 80
percent of all births observed in the ASSD. Once a mother leaves the labor market and gives birth to
additional children, these birth dates will not be recorded in the ASSD any longer. However, based on
information about the characteristics of the mother herself and the date of birth of the preceding child, I
am able to recover some births that are only observed in the Austrian Birth Register. The mother’s unique
social security number can be added to these recovered births. This method allows me to add 87,362 births
to the combined data set.
10For PL eligibility I follow the definition of Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009). In order to construct the
eligible sample, I consider the work history 2 years prior to giving birth to the first child. Women who show
any form of employment or were eligible to collect unemployment benefits are considered eligible. This very
generous form of eligibility results in 95 percent of women being eligible for PL.
11I count both normal as well as marginal employment as working days and use the terms worked and
employed interchangeably. For the construction of the number of days a mother worked, gestational length
in weeks (multiplied by 7 days a week) is subtracted from the exact date of birth. Working days (MO-FR)
are being calculated from the day of conception to the last day of pregnancy.
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In addition to days worked, days sick during pregnancy can be calculated in the same
manner. From this, I create a sickness dummy equaling 1 if a positive number of days sick
are reported. This sickness dummy will be used as an additional explanatory variable in the
OLS regression and allows me to compare my results to Wu¨st (2015).
For the analysis of the impact on newborn health, I use several measures of birth outcomes
because these have already been shown to be linked to later-life outcomes (Almond and
Currie, 2011). First, I include a dummy for low birth weight (below 2,500 grams) as a
general measure. Second, I construct a dummy for prematurity equaling 1 if gestational
length is less than 37 weeks.12 Additionally, I will show results for birth weight, gestational
length, 1 minute Apgar score, and a dummy for a healthy Apgar score (1[Apgar >= 7]).
The Apgar score is a method of giving a quick summary of the newborn’s physical health.
It individually measures per category, on a scale from 0 to 2, the newborn’s skin color, heart
rate, reflexes, muscle tone, and respiratory effort. A total Apgar score of 10 indicates perfect
health, and an Apgar score below 7 is defined as low.
Finally, I control for the following maternal characteristics: a dummy for marital status,
an indicator of foreign origin, 5-year age brackets, and an indicator combining wage and ed-
ucational data.13 For the heterogeneity analysis, I further add a dummy for having worked
in a blue-collar job during the first pregnancy.
Summary Statistics. Table (1) presents the descriptive statistics for the full matched
and eligible sample. While column (1) describes the full sample, columns (2)–(4) restrict
the sample to second-born children with older siblings born in the vicinity of the policy
reform thresholds.14 When compared to the full sample, second born with older siblings
born around a policy reform are less likely to be born preterm and with low birth weight.
12Both thresholds of weight (low birth weight) and gestational age (preterm) are defined by the World
Health Organization.
13Following Danzer et al. (2017), I construct this indicator variable by defining all mothers as low SES
who completed compulsory schooling or who completed apprenticeship training or intermediate vocational
school and additionally have low wages. For the assignment to high and low wage, I use average wage data
in the two years prior to a mother’s first birth. I classify a women as low wage if her wage is below or equal
to the median wage in that specific birth year for all women in my sample. Mothers who have completed at
least high school or who finished apprenticeship training or intermediate vocational school and earn a high
wage are defined as high-SES mothers.
14The chosen bandwidth in my baseline analysis is 24 months pre- and post-policy reform.
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Their mothers are more likely to be married and older, as expected. Therefore, as I will
focus on higher-order born children who are potentially affected by their mother’s longer (or
shorter) parental leave stay with the first-born child, the sample will be slightly positively
selected with respect to newborn health. However, as 78 percent of Austrian families have
more than one child in my sample, this implies that my analysis is based on a non-negligible
fraction of births.
In the restricted samples (columns (2)–(4)), the average birth weight ranges from 3,381–3,419
grams and the average gestational length is around 39.7 weeks. The average occurrence of
a low birth weight birth is between 3.2–3.3 percent and the one of a preterm birth 3.2–3.6
percent. The 1 minute Apgar scores vary between 8.7–8.9 and 95.8–97.5 percent of the new-
borns have a healthy Apgar score above 7. Most of the mothers are married (0.72–0.80) and
give birth to their second child between the ages of 25–29 (0.38–0.45). On average, about
60 percent of the mothers work during pregnancy with their second child and spend 63–69
days at work.
5 Empirical design
This paper focuses on identifying the causal effect of working during pregnancy on newborn
health. Specifically, consider the following baseline model:
Yi = β0 + β1work
m
i + β2X
c
i + β3X
m
i + τt + i, (1)
where for each individual i, Yi is the outcome of interest. work
m
i represents a dummy for the
work status of the mother during pregnancy or the days worked. Xci controls for the child’s
gender. The vector Xmi of maternal characteristics includes controls for 5-year age brackets,
marital status, origin, and low SES. τt is a vector controlling for year of birth and month of
birth fixed effects and i is an error term. β1 is the coefficient of interest corresponding to
the effect of prenatal employment on newborn health.
One issue with estimating Equation (1) is omitted variable bias. One such example is
the mother’s own health status. A mother might choose not to work because she is in bad
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health, which also directly influences the health of her own child. Other unobserved variables
that could threaten the validity of a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) approach, are,
for example, income and stress.
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). To overcome the issue of omitted variable bias,
I base my analysis on the described reforms of the parental leave system that generate
quasi-experimental variation in the likelihood of mothers working during pregnancy. More
specifically, I use three separate regression discontinuities for the three reforms in July 1990,
July 1996, and July 2000. The RDD method and its use in economics is extensively sum-
marized by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010). It is based on the
intuition that all mothers giving birth to their first child just before or just after a policy
change do not differ discontinuously in their characteristics, but rather, face two different
policies that discontinuously affect a mother’s prenatal employment status.
To see this better, imagine two mothers, Mother A and Mother B. Mother A gives birth
to her first child in June 1990 and can stay on parental leave up to the first birthday of
her child. She has to conceive her second baby by December 1990. If she meets this time
window, she does not have to go back to work during the pregnancy with her second child.
Mother B gives birth to her first child in July 1990, only one month later than Mother A.
She can stay on parental leave for two years and must conceive by January 1992 in order
to be exempt from the work requirement. Mother A and Mother B are unlikely to differ in
characteristics ex ante. However, Mother B is much more likely to give birth to another child
within the grace period. This discontinuity in the likelihood of working during pregnancy
with the consecutive child stemming from an exogenous policy reform will be exploited in
the following estimation.
Estimation. Following Jacob et al. (2012) and Lee and Lemieux (2010), I estimate local
linear regressions in samples around the cutoffs. I estimate separate OLS regressions with
a rectangular kernel for each cutoff date and choose in my context a meaningful bandwidth
of 24 months. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), the choice of kernel typically has little
impact in practice. I also conduct a sensitivity analysis with different bandwidths chosen
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by the method of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) or Calonico et al. (2016).15 I report
graphical evidence of the robustness to different bandwidths in the Appendix.
I start by documenting the discontinuity of prolonged parental leave on prenatal employ-
ment for mothers having a second child. I estimate the following first-stage regression:
workmi = γ0 + γ1Ti + γ2Ri + γ3Ti ∗Ri + υi. (2)
The variable Ti describes an indicator variable for having an older sibling being born in the
post-policy reform period. Ri is the rating variable, which indicates the number of months
from the older sibling’s birth date to the date of policy change, and υi is an idiosyncratic
error term. The parameter of interest in Equation (2) is γ1. γ1 describes the size of the
change in the outcome workmi at the date of the policy reforms and therefore highlights the
discontinuity in the share of mothers working during pregnancy with their second child.
In a second step, I examine the effect of the policy reform on newborn health using the
following reduced form equation:
Yi = δ0 + δ1Ti + δ2Ri + δ3Ti ∗Ri + νi. (3)
This reduced form equation provides estimates of the net effect of parental leave reforms on
newborn health.
Identification. The identifying assumptions for inference using the RDD are: (1) the
probability of being treated must be discontinuous at the cutoff, and (2) there should be
no discontinuity in potential outcomes at the cutoff (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The second
statement requires that no observable nor unobservable factors exhibit any discontinuities
at the cutoffs. This is likely fulfilled if there is no precise manipulation on either side of the
cutoff.
While assumption (1) holds by construction of the policy reform, assumption (2) cannot
15The bandwidth selection according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) is implemented in Stata by
the command rdcv and choosing ik as method. The bandwidth selection according to Calonico et al. (2016)
is implemented in Stata by the command rdbwselect and choosing the default method mserd.
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be directly validated. However, I can conduct standard tests for asserting the validity of
assumption (2). The timing of the policy announcement guarantees that individuals cannot
perfectly sort at the policy reform threshold. As described by Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009),
the policy reform in 1990, for example, was only announced three months before implemen-
tation and therefore made perfect birth planning impossible. However, pregnant mothers
could still influence the timing of a birth via a Caesarean section within a short time window,
which I will address in the robustness analysis.
Additionally, to asses credibility of assumption (2) based on observables, I visualize the
relationship between the covariates and the rating variable as reported in Figure (A2). In
the context of possible confounders, these variables should evolve smoothly across the cut-
off. Furthermore, I also report a Covariate Balance Test (see Table (A1)), where I test for
discontinuities in my observable variables using regressions outcomes. Across all these tests,
the smoothness of predetermined observable maternal characteristics is fulfilled.16
Sample Selection. Although the regression discontinuity design likely circumvents the
problem of omitted variables bias described above, it does not solve the problem of sample
selection. Sample selection in this context can arise as only newborn health measures become
observable for those women who choose to become mothers. If the policy changes regarding
the duration of paid parental leave directly affect fertility decisions, this might influence the
sample of mothers for which the newborn’s health is observed. In their analysis, Lalive and
Zweimu¨ller (2009) and Lalive et al. (2013) show direct fertility effects of the 1990 policy
reform, but no such effects for the other two reforms, in 1996 and 2000.17 In order to address
the issue of sample selection in the 1990 reform, I follow the approach described by Kim
(2016) and Dong (2017) in a robustness analysis to support the causal interpretation of
prenatal employment and not only the net effect of the policy reform.
The approach is based on estimating treatment bounds in the presence of sample se-
16The covariate balance test for the effect on being married reports a significant reduction on being
married after the 2000 reform. However, in terms of magnitude this effect is relatively small.
17I re-estimate the fertility effect for the 1990 reform with my own sample and find that the policy leads
to 2.5 additional children per 100 women within three years. With an estimated first-stage effect size of 19.1
women per 100 women who additionally do not work after the change in the policy, the effect of the sample
selection seems relatively small.
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lection, leaving the formal specification in Equations (2) and (3) unchanged. Compared to
other approaches that deal with sample selection, the chosen one does not require specifying
any selection mechanism nor any exclusion restrictions. The only additional assumption
for identification is (3) monotonicity, which implies that observability of outcomes is only
affected in one direction due to treatment assignment. In the described context, this means
that all mothers who gave birth to an additional child in the less-generous parental leave
period (before July 1990) would also give birth under the new rules. After the policy reform,
additional mothers join the sample who are only induced to give birth to another child under
the more generous policy scheme. Monotonicity would be violated if there are mothers who
would only give birth to an additional child in the less-generous pre-reform policy period.
Here, the assumption of monotonocity is reasonable as mothers who give birth after the
policy reform could still go back to work after 1 year and face the same opportunities as
pre-policy reform.
The treatment bounds are intended to estimate the share of additional mothers in the
after-reform sample (∼5 percent). These are the marginal mothers who were induced to have
a second child by the reform. Their newborns’ outcomes are observable after the reform but
not before. In terms of outcomes, these newborns cannot be distinguished from the control
group. Therefore, without invoking any additional assumptions, one can assume the extreme
situation. In this extreme situation, I restrict the sample to a very favorable group (excluding
the lower 5 percent in the respective outcome distribution) and a very unfavourable group
(excluding the upper 5 percent in the respective outcome distribution). This provides me
with a lower and an upper bound.18
6 Results
This section starts by discussing the OLS effects of working during pregnancy on newborn
health. I will then show, graphically and empirically, RDD estimates of the effects of changing
PL duration on maternal employment during pregnancy with her second child and newborn
health. I end by reporting several sensitivity analyses in order to test for robustness.
18Standard erros in this approach are calculated via bootstrapping.
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6.1 Baseline OLS estimates
Table (2) presents baseline OLS results for estimates of Equation (1). All columns are esti-
mated on the pooled sample of the three RDD 24-months-bandwidth samples with second-
born children. Columns (1) and (3) include only child-level characteristics such as a gender
dummy, year, and month of birth fixed effects. In columns (2) and (4), referred to as the full
control model, I additionally control for mother-level characteristics: 5-year age dummies,19
an indicator of foreign origin, a dummy for the marital status, and a dummy for low SES.
Table (2) is split into Panel A, the extensive margin effect of the work status on newborn
health, and Panel B, the intensive margin effect of days worked on newborn health. Both
a mother’s work status and the days worked during pregnancy are positively related to
newborn health outcome measures. The full control model suggests that children of mothers
who work during pregnancy are, at the mean, 6.3 percent less likely to be born preterm and
7.0 percent less likely to be of low birth weight, respectively.20 The effect sizes are slightly
bigger in the full control model for the effect of days worked. A baby of a mother who
works 65 days (the average of the three RDD samples) versus that of a mother who does
not work at all, is on average 19.4 percent less likely to be born preterm and 19.9 percent
less likely to be of low birth weight, all else being equal. Estimates on the two continuous
outcome variables of birth weight and gestational length and those for the 1 minute Apgar
score and the healthy Apgar score dummy are reported in Tables (3)–(4). Both show the
same direction of correlations, while the ones with the Apgar scores are relatively weak.
The sickness dummy is negatively correlated with all newborn health measures, as re-
ported in Panels A and B in Table (2). The full control model shows that being sick leads at
the mean to an increase of 91.0–93.4 percent and 91.1–93.3 percent in preterm birth and low
birth weight, respectively. To give some idea of the magnitude of this effect, I can compare
this finding with Wu¨st (2015). She reports an increase in preterm birth of roughly 43 percent
at the mean if the mother reports being sick during pregnancy.21
19I also test for other specifications of the age variable commonly used in the literature, such as age and
age squared. My main coefficients of interest are, however, unaffected.
20The percent terms are evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable, i.e. for the outcome variable
preterm: (0.0335-0.0021)/0.0335-1 = -0.063.
21However, Wu¨st (2015) estimates this effect on the full sample. If I re-run the OLS regression on my full
sample as described in Table (1) Column (1) including all parities and not only second born, I get an increase
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Controlling for mother’s characteristics only marginally affects the size of the coefficients
of interest.22 However, controlling for a broad set of observables is not sufficient to rule out
endogeneity concerns. Therefore, I will exploit the policy reforms in the next sections in
a regression discontinuity set-up to infer the impact of prenatal employment on newborn
health.
6.2 First-stage estimates
Graphical evidence. In this section, I test the first stage described in Equation (2). In
particular, I focus on the extensions of parental leave for the first child and the impact on
mothers’ employment status during pregnancy with her second child. Figure (3) graphically
represents the results. Dots refer to monthly averages, to which linearly fitted values and 95
percent confidence intervals are added. There are statistically significant and economically
meaningful discontinuities in the direction as expected around the cutoff dates. The 1990
reform, for example, leads to an approximate decline of 19 percentage points in the share
of mothers employed during pregnancy with the second child giving birth to their first child
right after July 1990 compared to mothers that gave birth just before the policy reform.
The discontinuities for the reforms in 1996 and 2000 highlight the same pattern. When
parental leave for the first child declines, as in 1996, the share of mothers employed during
pregnancy with their second child increases by approximately 7 percentage points; it declines
by 6 percentage points with the extension of parental leave in the year 2000. The intensive
margin of days worked corroborates these patterns, where for example in 1990, a 14 percent
drop of a potential total of 160 days worked resulted in 22 fewer days worked.23
Estimation results. Table (5) presents regression estimates of Equation (2). Each regres-
sion is estimated with a chosen bandwidth of 24 months. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show
regression results, while columns (2), (4), and (6) add mother’s characteristics as controls.
All estimates corroborate the graphical evidence found in Figure (3) and confirm the statis-
of 46–52 percent in a preterm birth if a mother is sick, which is comparable in size to the one reported by
Wu¨st (2015).
22Table (A2) reports the entire set of coefficients for mother characteristics.
23The 160 days are the product of mothers working 32 weeks during pregnancy times 5 days per week.
The 32 weeks are the result of an average pregnancy lasting 40 weeks minus 8 weeks mothers have to spend
on maternity leave.
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tical significance of the discontinuities in mother’s work behavior at the cutoff. In terms of
magnitude, the 1990 reform has the strongest impact in the full control model on maternal
employment during pregnancy with her second child, decreasing the percentage of mothers
employed and the days employed by 19.1 percentage points and 23.0 days, respectively. The
corresponding numbers for the 1996 reform show an increase of 7.2 percentage points and
9.5 days in the employment share and days worked. The 2000 reform leads to a decline of
6.4 percentage points in the percentage of mothers working and a decline of 6.6 days in the
days worked. Altogether, the documented effects are significant, precisely estimated, and
economically important.
The point estimates of the effect of having an older sibling being born post-policy reform
on the work status and the days worked do not vary with the inclusion of predetermined
mother’s controls. This robustness to the inclusion of additional controls confirms the validity
of the RDD in this setting. Furthermore, the regression results are also robust to other choices
of bandwidths (see Figure (A3)) and functional forms (see Table (A3)).
6.3 Reduced-form estimates
Graphical evidence. This section reports the reduced-form estimates of Equation (3). In
particular, I analyze the impact of the extension of parental leave for the first child on
several health outcomes for the newborn child, such as being born preterm or with low
birth weight. These reduced-form estimates can be interpreted as the net effect of the policy
reforms on newborn health. As the first-stage estimates were generally large and statistically
significant, we would expect to see sizeable effects on newborn health if there is a relationship
between the latter and a mother’s work status.
Figure (4) shows the effects of the policy changes on newborn health. Dots represent
monthly averages and solid lines correspond to values from a linear fit. There is no significant
discontinuity visible. This holds true for any of the outcome variables and also for all three
policy reforms. Linking these results with the discontinuous jump found for the first-stage
results of prenatal employment leads to the conclusion that my estimates are consistent with
a null hypothesis of no effect of maternal employment during pregnancy on newborn health.
Estimation results. The graphical results are complemented with regression outputs
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estimating Equation (3) in Table (6). All columns include a gender dummy, year of birth and
month of birth fixed effects. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show regression results with child-
level controls only, while columns (2), (4), and (6) add mother’s characteristics controls.
All estimates support the graphical evidence found in Figure (4). For all three reforms
and all newborn health outcomes, I document statistically insignificant and generally small
effects. For example in 1990, the estimates allow me to rule out an increase of more than
0.6 percentage points and a decline of more than 0.2 percentage points in the probability of
being born with low birth weight.24 Furthermore, the point estimates are not affected by
the inclusion of mother’s characteristics controls. Overall, these results indicate that the net
impact of the extension of parental leave duration for the first child and the accompanying
significant reduction in prenatal employment during pregnancy with the second child on
newborn health is negligible.
6.4 Robustness tests
In this section, I test the robustness of my results. For most of the reported results, I will
only focus on the 1990 reform because all conclusions hold true for the other reforms.
Alternative outcome measures. Figure (5) reports results on additional outcome measures
such as birth weight, gestational length, 1 min Apgar score, and a dummy for a healthy
Apgar score. As with the two main outcome measures discussed so far, there are no visible
discontinuities around the thresholds. This is convincing that there is no effect of the reform
on any newborn health measure. While preterm and low birth weight dummies might capture
effects on very vulnerable newborns, the continuous variables of birth weight and gestational
age and Apgar scores measure potentially another dimension of newborn health.
Different birth weight and gestational age thresholds. In Figure (A4), I report the reduced-
form effect for separate regressions with different choices of birth weight and gestational age
cutoffs. While low birth weight, defined as less than 2,500 grams, and being born preterm,
defined as less than 37 weeks of gestational age, are relatively arbitrary cutoffs, I show that
the results are robust to different choices for these outcome variables. No matter what birth
24This is the result of a 95 percent confidence interval, leading to a positive effect of a maximum of +0.006
(=0.002+1.96*0.002) and a minimum of -0.002 (=0.002-1.96*0.002).
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weight and gestational age threshold is chosen, the effect of the policy reforms on these birth
outcomes is statistically insignificant.
Donut estimations. Panel A of Table (7) shows results of Donut estimations, which
create a hole in the middle of the sample. Here I exclude data points from second borns
with older siblings born within a week on both sides of the cutoff. As all policy reforms were
announced only shortly before the actual implementation, selection into motherhood and
therefore a perfect planning of birth into a specific policy regime can be ruled out. However,
the choice of a Caesarean section and therefore timing the birth might still be possible up to
a short time window of around 1 week. Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) investigate the issue of
this narrow-window timing and argue that although there is a steady increase in births on a
day-to-day basis from June to July, there is no discontinuity in the reported births on July
1. Also in my analysis, results are robust to this adjustment and all conclusions hold true.
Adding third born. In Panel B of Table (7), I add the sample of third born with an
older sibling born 24 months around the cutoff of a policy reform. Although the sample
size and therefore the precision increase, Panel B detects no major changes to the previous
conclusions. Mothers are significantly less likely to work during pregnancy with their higher-
order child if facing longer parental leave with their older child. Effects on newborn health
measures for their consecutive child are still not significant. This highlights that the results
are not specific only to second borns.
Sample selection. Panel C of Table (7) addresses the previously raised concern of se-
lection into second motherhood by reporting bounds on treatment effects in the presence
of possible selection. Applying the monotonicity assumption for the 1990 reform yields the
bounds reported in Panel C in Table (7), where I draw the same conclusions as before. Ma-
ternal employment during pregnancy with the second child decreases significantly with no
significant effects on newborn health for the second child.
Placebo reform 1988. In Panel D of Table (7), I show estimation results of a placebo
regression assuming a policy reform in July 1988. As expected, this placebo treatment in a
non reform year shows no significant effects for any of the outcome variables. Interestingly, as
this is known to be a true zero effect, I can compare the standard errors of this specification
with the results reported for the three reforms in Table (6). The size of the standard errors
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of the two outcome measures is very similar for the placebo and the reform regressions.
7 Discussion
Heterogeneity. I stratify my sample according to several different maternal characteristics.25
I start by analyzing broad subsamples in which I classify mothers into blue versus white collar,
low versus high socioeconomic status, and married versus unmarried. Several considerations
give rise to these broad classifications. Stratification by occupational collar, for example,
allows me to differentiate between manual labor versus office work due to its correlation
with job task. A priori, it is not clear whether one would expect more beneficial effects for
one or the other, as different types of job tasks could have varying effects over the pregnancy
cycle. Socioeconomic status considers general differences in which potentially both low- and
high-SES mothers benefit from the parental leave policy. Job protection might favor high
SES mothers where her skills are more attached to her current job, while paid leave might
be more beneficial for low-SES mothers. Finally, one might expect married mothers to react
stronger in decreasing prenatal employment due to longer leave, as they are in a stable family
environment and thus are more likely to plan subsequent fertility.
Results for these subgroups are reported in Figure (6) and are in line with expectations.
There are differences across subgroups with respect to prenatal maternal employment; how-
ever, except for married versus unmarried mothers, these are not large and the effect for
each subgroup per se is sizeable and significantly different from zero. Unlike prenatal em-
ployment, the general finding for newborn health measures across all reported subgroups
is not statistically different from zero. Standard erros become larger for smaller subgroups
(such as unmarried mothers for example), but all estimates are relatively small in absolute
terms. The only difference occurs across socioeconomic status where there is a sign switch
for the effect of reduced prenatal employment on the likelihood of a preterm birth. However,
as both effects are still indistinguishable from zero, in a next step, I refine mothers by income
quintiles.
25Information about mother’s characteristics refer to the first pregnancy to mitigate possible endogeneity
concerns.
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Results for mothers by income quintiles are reported in Figure (7). Interestingly, the
results by socioeconomic status, which were insignificant but of opposing sign, become sta-
tistically significant despite smaller sample groups. All mothers are less likely to work during
pregnancy after the 1990 reform and show sizeable reductions in prenatal employment from
12.9–21.3 percentage points. The reduction in prenatal employment leads to better outcomes
for their newborns (i.e. a reduction in preterm births by 1.3 percentage points) for mothers
in the lowest income quintile and to worse outcomes for their newborns (i.e. an increase in
preterm births by 1.4 percentage points) for mothers in the highest income quintile. These
results can be explained by income effects during pregnancy. The parental leave policy is
designed as flat benefit, which describes an income improvement for some mothers and an
income decline for others. The increase in income for low-income mothers and the reduction
in preterm births is in line with previous literature (Hoynes et al., 2015; Almond et al., 2011;
Barber and Gertler, 2008; Amarante et al., 2016). More interestingly, and also substantially
less studied in the literature, is the harmful effect on newborn health of decreasing income
for high-income mothers.
While the stratification by income quintile hints toward an income effect, the effect cannot
be explained by differential occupational exposures.26 I also conduct subgroup analysis by
industry and find no significant effects on newborn health measures. This is interesting as
one might expect different types of occupations to expose mothers to different types of risky
behavior during pregnancy, as for example, smoking in the hospitality industry or diseases
in the human health and social work industry.
I also test for other heterogeneous subgroups such as gender of the child, above median
age of the mother, country of origin of the mother, and health outcomes of the preceding
child (i.e. born with low birth weight). I find a zero effect on all newborn health measures
for all of these subgroups.
Age Difference. Although the mean difference in months from the first to second born
is not affected by any of the policy reforms, certain specific age windows could be affected
by the design of the policy reforms. From a medical point of view, siblings with an age
26Results are not reported here but are available upon request.
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difference of less than 18 months are particularly interesting to look at more closely, as this
very short spacing can lead to worse outcomes of the second born (Conde-Agudelo et al.,
2006). Therefore, for a better understanding of the age difference between first- and second-
born children, I decompose the effect into respective age categories implied by the three
policy reforms. Table (A4) reports the results. An extension of parental leave as in 1990
and 2000 reduces the likelihood of very small age differences, while a reduction in parental
leave increases the likelihood of small age differences. The effect is significant for the 1990
and 1996 reforms. Thus, if short spacing would harm the health of the second-born child,
this would bias the effect of prenatal maternal employment on newborn health upwards in
1990 and downwards in 1996. However, in terms of magnitude, both effects are small.
8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of maternal employment during pregnancy on newborn health.
I use data on all Austrian births and work histories of the respective mothers. To overcome
the endogeneity of employment decisions, I exploit three policy reforms regarding the du-
ration of parental leave. I find no evidence that prenatal employment affects any of the
outcomes, measured via birth weight, gestational age, and Apgar scores. This stands in
contrast to the positive correlation of prenatal employment with newborn health as reported
in the OLS regressions.
For the 1990 reform, which extended parental leave from one to two years, I document a
significant 19.1 percentage point decline in the share of mothers employed during pregnancy
with their second child and insignificant effects for all newborn health measures. Even
though prenatal employment varies substantially by subgroups, I find no evidence of an
effect on health outcomes at birth even in these subpopulations. The subgroup analysis by
income quintiles is the only one to reveal significant effects on newborn health, which can be
explained by income effects (i.e. higher income for poorer mothers leads to better newborn
health).
This study shows that the net effect of changes in parental leave policies for the second
child is insignificant. This result is robust to the inclusion of covariates and several different
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specifications. The zero effect of prenatal employment adds to the scarce and conflicting
literature on maternal employment during pregnancy on newborn health. With increasing
employment rates for pregnant women, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms of prenatal
employment on newborn health.
The literature on the effects of pregnancy conditions on long-term outcomes identifies the
second trimester of a pregnancy as the trimester with the strongest neural brain development
(Schwandt, 2017; Black et al., 2014). This could mean that the effect of exposure to maternal
labor market participation during pregnancy could only be detectable in the long run and
may not be visible on the day of birth. As such, linking prenatal employment with long-term
outcomes such as educational attainment and labor market participation of the child itself
could be explored in future studies.
The findings in this paper should interest policymakers and pregnant women. Unlike
post natal child rearing, the duty of pregnancy cannot be shared among partners. However,
this should not worry mothers or employers, as there is no evidence that the working status
during pregnancy leads to bad health outcomes for the unborn baby. However, the results
should also be interpreted within the Austrian context, where women are relatively well
protected against hazardous situations at their workplace while pregnant. Furthermore, the
results of this paper will help women to optimally allocate the time allowed by parental leave
policies. Several countries design their parental leave policies in such a way that women can
choose how to divide a certain amount of weeks pre- and post-birth. These results show that
women can safely take a majority of their parental leave after giving birth.
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9 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Overview policy changes
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Figure 2: Employment status of mothers by week of pregnancy
(a) 1990 (b) 1996 (c) 2000
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Notes: This Figure reports the share of women who work during pregnancy with their second child. Mothers
considered are all women pregnant with their second child who gave birth to their first child 24 months before
and after the policy changes in July 1990, July 1996 and July 2000. Hollow squares and circles refer to weeks
where mothers are supposed to be on maternity leave (after week 32). The sample consists of all matched
and eligible mothers that are still pregnant at a given week of pregnancy (i.e. with preterm births the sample
gets smaller moving from week 0 to week 40).
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Figure 3: RDD plots - prenatal employment
Panel A: Share employed during 2nd pregnancy
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Panel B: Percentage of days employed per 2nd pregnancy
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Notes: This Figure reports the fraction of mothers working during pregnancy with their second child and
the average percentage of days employed per pregnancy by month of birth of the first child. All subfigures
are based on the full sample of matched and eligible mothers that gave birth to their first child not more
than 24 months apart from a policy reform.
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Figure 4: RDD plots - newborn health
Panel A: Share low birth weight
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Panel B: Share preterm
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Notes: This Figure reports the average share of second children being born with low birth weight and preterm
by month of birth of the first child (their older sibling). Note that I introduce a shifter for subfigure (b).
Birth weight has been reported in hectograms up to December 1998. From January 1999 birth weight is
measured in decagrams. This switch goes hand in hand with a discontinuous increase in birth weight and
decrease in the probability of low birth weight most likely due to a rounding down previous to 1999. I correct
for it in these graphs by multiplying birth weight observed after the shift with the change in yearly average
values from 1998 to 1999. All subfigures are based on the full sample of matched and eligible mothers that
gave birth to their first child not more than 24 months apart from a policy reform.
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Figure 5: RDD plots - newborn health additional outcome measures
Panel A: Birth weight
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Panel B: Gestational age
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Panel C: Apgar 1 min score
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Panel D: Share with healthy Apgar score (>= 7)
(j) (k) (l)
.
95
.
97
.
99
Sh
ar
e 
he
al
th
y 
Ap
ga
r s
co
re
1988m7 1990m7 1992m7
month of birth (1st child)
.
95
.
97
.
99
1994m7 1996m7 1998m7
month of birth (1st child)
.
95
.
97
.
99
1998m7 2000m7 2002m7
month of birth (1st child)
Notes: This Figure reports the average birth weight, gestational age, 1 min Apgar score and the share with
a healthy Apgar score (>= 7) of second children by month of birth of the first child (their older sibling).
Note that I introduce a shifter for the subfigure (b) as outlined in the Notes of Figure (4). All subfigures are
based on the full sample of matched and eligible mothers that gave birth to their first child not more than
24 months apart from a policy reform.
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Figure 6: RDD estimates - general heterogeneity
Panel A: Work estimates
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Notes: This Figure reports in Panel A (B) parameter estimates for different specifications for the coefficient
γ1 (δ1) of having an older sibling born post policy reform on work status and days worked (low birth weight
and preterm). Regression coefficients with a 95 percent confidence interval are displayed. The sample consists
of all matched and eligible mothers that gave birth to their first child not more than 24 months apart from
the respective policy reform. 34
Figure 7: RDD estimates - heterogeneity by income quintiles
Panel A: Work estimates
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Notes: This Figure reports in Panel A (B) parameter estimates for different specifications for the coefficient
γ1 (δ1) of having an older sibling born post policy reform on work status and days worked (low birth weight
and preterm). Regression coefficients with a 95 percent confidence interval are displayed. The sample consists
of all matched and eligible mothers that gave birth to their first child not more than 24 months apart from
the respective policy reform. 35
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Full sample 1990 sample 1996 sample 2000 sample
Birth weight (in gram) 3,320.028 3,381.319 3,410.534 3,419.033
(519.768) (500.795) (505.488) (503.999)
Birth length (in cm) 50.494 50.699 50.785 50.746
(2.641) (2.507) (2.559) (2.572)
Gestational length (in weeks) 39.686 39.797 39.757 39.665
(1.776) (1.625) (1.678) (1.710)
Preterm birth 0.043 0.032 0.033 0.036
Low birth weight 0.046 0.032 0.032 0.033
Apgar 1min score 8.741 8.798 8.850 8.891
(1.096) (0.992) (0.950) (0.903)
Healthy Apgar score (>= 7) 0.958 0.968 0.971 0.975
Female baby 0.487 0.489 0.486 0.487
Mother married 0.688 0.804 0.763 0.724
Mother foreign 0.121 0.087 0.140 0.152
Mother aged 15-19 0.056 0.013 0.009 0.009
Mother aged 20-24 0.278 0.248 0.174 0.178
Mother aged 25-29 0.356 0.445 0.412 0.375
Mother aged 30-34 0.221 0.230 0.312 0.323
Mother aged 35-39 0.077 0.058 0.086 0.103
Mother aged 40-45 0.012 0.006 0.008 0.011
Mother of low SES 0.519 0.529 0.464 0.436
Worked 0.759 0.611 0.607 0.563
Days worked 95.881 69.826 68.847 63.528
Observations 1,279,374 87,566 77,279 63,481
Notes: The full sample covers the universe of births occurring from 1984 to 2007 to matched
and eligible mothers. Columns (2)-(4) restrict the full sample to second born children with
an older sibling that is born 24 months pre- and post a policy reform. The policy reforms
considered happen in July 1990 for Column (2), July 1996 for Column (3) and July 2000 for
Column (4).
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Table 2: OLS results on preterm and low birth weight
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Preterm Low birth weight
Panel A: Work status
Worked −0.0020∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Sick 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Panel B: Days worked
Days worked −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Sick 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Mother Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.0335 0.0335 0.0327 0.0327
Observations 226,824 226,824 226,824 226,824
Notes: This Table is estimated on the pooled sample of the three RDD regression windows.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional controls included in all
columns are year and month of birth FE, and a gender dummy. Mother’s characteristic
controls are dummies for 5 year age brackets, marital status, a dummy for low SES (combined
from educational and wage data) and a foreign origin dummy.
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Table 3: OLS results on birth weight and gestational length
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Birth weight Gestational length
Panel A: Work status
Worked 11.3360∗∗∗ 6.3355∗∗∗ 0.0136∗ 0.0285∗∗∗
(2.1728) (2.2083) (0.0073) (0.0074)
Sick −81.5409∗∗∗ −80.1422∗∗∗ −0.3414∗∗∗ −0.3484∗∗∗
(4.4193) (4.4512) (0.0163) (0.0165)
Panel B: Days worked
Days worked 0.1721∗∗∗ 0.1530∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0154) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Sick −78.7184∗∗∗ −78.1331∗∗∗ −0.3294∗∗∗ −0.3373∗∗∗
(4.4173) (4.4437) (0.0163) (0.0164)
Mother Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 3,401.5743 3,401.5743 39.7474 39.7474
Observations 226,824 226,824 226,824 226,824
Notes: This Table is estimated on the pooled sample of the three RDD regression windows. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional controls included in all columns are year
and month of birth FE, and a gender dummy. Mother’s characteristic controls are dummies for
5 year age brackets, marital status, a dummy for low SES (combined from educational and wage
data) and a foreign origin dummy.
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Table 4: OLS results on 1 min Apgar scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Apgar 1 min score Healthy Apgar score
Panel A: Work status
Worked 0.0023 0.0046 0.0005 0.0006
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Sick −0.0849∗∗∗ −0.0786∗∗∗ −0.0113∗∗∗ −0.0104∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Panel B: Days worked
Days worked 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Sick −0.0833∗∗∗ −0.0771∗∗∗ −0.0111∗∗∗ −0.0101∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Mother Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 8.8413 8.8413 0.9711 0.9711
Observations 226,493 226,493 226,824 226,824
Notes: This Table is estimated on the pooled sample of the three RDD regression windows.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional controls included in all columns
are year and month of birth FE, and a gender dummy. Mother’s characteristic controls are
dummies for 5 year age brackets, marital status, a dummy for low SES (combined from edu-
cational and wage data) and a foreign origin dummy.
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Table 5: RDD effects on maternal employment during pregnancy
1990 1996 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dependent variable employment status
1{Post policy reform} −0.191∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Comparison Mean 0.714 0.714 0.587 0.587 0.600 0.600
Panel B: Dependent variable days worked
1{Post policy reform} −23.105∗∗∗ −23.011∗∗∗ 9.147∗∗∗ 9.493∗∗∗ −6.712∗∗∗ −6.636∗∗∗
(0.924) (0.891) (0.980) (0.954) (1.083) (1.059)
Comparison Mean 82.720 82.720 65.607 65.607 67.369 67.369
Additional Mother Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 87,566 87,566 77,279 77,279 63,481 63,481
Notes: This Table is estimated on the matched and eligible sample of second born with an older sibling born within
a bandwidth of 24 months around the policy reforms. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional
mother’s characteristic controls include dummies for 5 year age brackets, marital status, a dummy for low SES (combined
from educational and wage data) and a foreign origin dummy. The 1{post policy reform} coefficient estimate reports
the impact of a first birth just after the policy reform versus just before. Panel A estimates the effects on employment
status and Panel B on the number of days worked during pregnancy with the second child.
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Table 6: RDD effects on newborn health of second born
1990 1996 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dependent variable low birth weight
1{Post policy reform} 0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Comparison Mean 0.031 0.031 0.034 0.034 0.031 0.031
Panel B: Dependent variable preterm
1{Post policy reform} 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Comparison Mean 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.035
Additional Mother Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 87,566 87,566 77,279 77,279 63,481 63,481
Notes: This Table is estimated on the matched and eligible sample of second born with an older sibling born within
a bandwidth of 24 months around the policy reforms. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All
columns include a gender dummy, year of birth and month of birth fixed effects. Additional mother’s characteristic
controls include dummies for 5 year age brackets, marital status, a dummy for low SES (combined from educational
and wage data) and a foreign origin dummy. The 1{post policy reform} coefficient estimate reports the impact of
a first birth just after the policy reform versus just before. Panel A estimates the effects on low birth weight and
Panel B on being born preterm.
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Table 7: Robustness - 1990 reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Worked Days worked Low birth weight Preterm
Panel A: excluding 1 week around cutoff
1{Post policy reform} −0.191∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −22.961∗∗∗ −22.848∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(0.007) (0.006) (0.942) (0.908) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 86,702 86,702 86,702 86,702 86,702 86,702 86,702 86,702
Panel B: adding third born
1{Post policy reform} −0.167∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗ −20.050∗∗∗ −19.958∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.811) (0.785) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 113,294 113,294 113,294 113,294 113,294 113,294 113,294 113,294
Panel C: Bounds on Treatment Effects
Treatment Bounds [ -0.194, -0.127] [ -23.726, -15.663] [ -0.003, 0.008] [ -0.002, 0.008]
Panel D: Placebo cutoff July 1988
1{Post policy reform} 0.000 0.001 -0.243 -0.123 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.947) (0.920) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 80,754 80,754 80,754 80,754 80,754 80,754 80,754 80,754
Comparison Mean 0.714 0.714 82.720 82.720 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.032
Comparison Mean incl. 3 born 0.684 0.684 78.625 78.625 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
Comparison Mean 1988 0.708 0.708 82.331 82.331 0.032 0.032 0.029 0.029
Additional Mother Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: This Table is estimated on the matched and eligible sample of second born (and 3d born in Panel B) with an older sibling born within a bandwidth of 24 months around the
policy reforms. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors in the treatment bound estimation reported in Panel C are calculated via bootstrapping. Columns
(5-8) include a gender dummy, year of birth and month of birth fixed effects. In Panel B Columns (5-8) additionally include birth order dummies. Additional Mother Controls include
dummies for 5 year age brackets, marital status, a dummy for low SES (combined from educational and wage data) and a foreign origin dummy. The 1{post policy reform} coefficient
estimate reports the impact of a first (or previous in Panel B) birth just after the policy reform versus just before. In Panel A births that happen within around 1 week of a policy
change are excluded. Panel B additionally also includes births of third born, Panel C implements bounds on the treatment effect under selection into second motherhood, and Panel D
shows Placebo estimates for an imaginary reform in July 1988.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Percent of second children born within parental leave and grace period
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Notes: This Figure shows the fraction of first born in families with at least two children that have a younger
sibling that is born within the parental leave and grace period. Orange dots refer to the percentage of second
children born within the parental leave period of the first child. Green triangles refer to the percentage of
second children born within the grace period after the parental leave period of the first child. Blue squares
refer to the sum of both. The solid vertical lines refer to the three policy changes, increasing the latest
consecutive birth date to 27.5 months in July 1990, decreasing it to 21.5 months in July 1996 and raising
it again to 33.5 months in July 2000. The data consists of the full matched and eligible sample of mothers
with at least two children.
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Figure A2: RDD plots - covariates
Panel A: Maternal age
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Panel B: Share married
(d) (e) (f)
.
68
.
76
.
84
Sh
ar
e 
m
ar
rie
d
1988m7 1990m7 1992m7
month of birth (1st child)
.
68
.
76
.
84
1994m7 1996m7 1998m7
month of birth (1st child)
.
68
.
76
.
84
1998m7 2000m7 2002m7
month of birth (1st child)
Panel C: Share low SES
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Panel D: Share foreign origin
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Notes: This Figure reports the composition of mothers giving birth to their second child by month of birth
of the first child. All subfigures are based on the full sample of matched and eligible mothers that gave birth
to their first child not more than 24 months apart from a policy reform.
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Figure A3: Robustness to different choices of bandwidths - work status and days employed
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Panel C: 2000
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Notes: This Figure reports the robustness of the RDD estimate on the work status and the days employed
from Equation (2) to different choices of bandwidths. The solid line refers to the point estimate of separate
equations, and the dashed lines indicate the corresponding 95 percent confidence interval. Panel A and C
refer to the increase in parental leave duration in July 1990 and July 2000, respectively. Panel B shows the
policy reform in July 1996, where parental leave duration declined. All Panels were estimated using the full
sample of matched and eligible mothers.
45
Figure A4: RDD estimates for different thresholds - 1990 reform
Panel A: Birth weight
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Notes: This Figure reports parameter estimates for the coefficient δ1 in Equation (3). In Panel A (B) for
every 100 grams (week) a separate regression is estimated, corresponding to another birth weight (gestational
age) threshold than the one used in the paper of 2,500 grams (37 weeks). 95 percent confidence intervals are
shown by vertical lines. All estimates are based on regressions including the full set of controls. The sample
consists of all matched and eligible mothers that gave birth to their first child not more than 24 months
apart from the policy reform in July 1990.
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Table A1: Covariate balance test
1990 1996 2000
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Dependent variable maternal age
1{Post policy reform} -0.032 -0.096 -0.004
(0.059) (0.062) (0.072)
Comparison Mean 27.412 28.735 28.822
Panel B: Dependent variable married
1{Post policy reform} -0.003 0.006 −0.014∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Comparison Mean 0.801 0.763 0.719
Panel C: Dependent variable share low SES
1{Post policy reform} 0.008 0.005 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Comparison Mean 0.522 0.456 0.432
Panel D: Dependent variable share foreign origin
1{Post policy reform} 0.007∗ -0.006 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Comparison Mean 0.073 0.144 0.152
Observations 87,566 77,279 63,481
Notes: This Table is estimated on the matched and eligible sample of second born with an older
sibling born within a bandwidth of 24 months around the policy reforms. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. The 1{post policy reform} coefficient estimate reports the impact of
a first birth just after the policy reform versus just before.
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Table A2: OLS results on preterm and low birth weight - Full set of mother characteristic
controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Preterm Low birth weight
Panel A: Work status
Worked −0.0020∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Sick 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Married −0.0056∗∗∗ −0.0094∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010)
Foreign 0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0012)
Aged 20-24 −0.0185∗∗∗ −0.0184∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0048)
Aged 25-29 −0.0202∗∗∗ −0.0214∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0048)
Aged 30-34 −0.0149∗∗∗ −0.0173∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0048)
Aged 35-39 -0.0027 -0.0027
(0.0050) (0.0051)
Aged 40-45 0.0139∗ 0.0110
(0.0074) (0.0074)
Low SES 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Panel B: Days worked
Days worked −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Sick 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Married −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0092∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010)
Foreign 0.0045∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0012)
Aged 20-24 −0.0176∗∗∗ −0.0177∗∗∗
((11.0632)) (0.0048)
Aged 25-29 −0.0185∗∗∗ −0.0201∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0048)
Aged 30-34 −0.0126∗∗∗ −0.0155∗∗∗
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(0.0048) (0.0048)
Aged 35-39 -0.0001 -0.0008
(0.0050) (0.0051)
Aged 40-45 0.0165∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0074)
Low SES 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Mother Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.0335 0.0335 0.0327 0.0327
Observations 226,824 226,824 226,824 226,824
Notes: This Table is estimated on the pooled sample of the three RDD
regression windows. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Additional controls included in all columns are year and month of birth FE,
and a gender dummy. Mother’s characteristic controls are dummies for 5
year age brackets, marital status, a dummy for low SES (combined from
educational and wage data) and a foreign origin dummy.
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Table A3: Robustness to different functional forms - 1990 reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Dependent variable work status
1{Post policy reform} −0.191∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
Comparison Mean 0.713 0.713 0.714 0.714 0.712 0.712 0.716 0.716
Panel B: Dependent variable days worked
1{Post policy reform} −22.965∗∗∗ −22.802∗∗∗ −23.105∗∗∗ −23.011∗∗∗ −23.042∗∗∗ −22.933∗∗∗ −22.244∗∗∗ −22.030∗∗∗
(0.919) (0.885) (0.924) (0.891) (0.922) (0.888) (1.401) (1.349)
Comparison Mean 82.104 82.104 82.720 82.720 82.400 82.400 82.825 82.825
Additional Mother Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 87,566 87,566 87,566 87,566 87,566 87,566 87,566 87,566
Spline Linear Linear Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic
Interaction Interaction Interaction Interaction
Notes: This Table is estimated on the matched and eligible sample of second born with an older sibling born within a bandwidth of 24 months around the
policy reforms. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional mother’s characteristic controls include dummies for 5 year age brackets,
marital status, a dummy for low SES (combined from educational and wage data) and a foreign origin dummy. The 1{post policy reform} coefficient estimate
reports the impact of a first birth on maternal employment just after the policy reform versus just before. The models that are tested are linear, linear
interaction, quadratic, and quadratic interaction as described by Jacob et al. (2012).
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Table A4: Age differences in detail
1990 sample 1996 sample 2000 sample
(1) (2) (3)
0-18 months −0.040∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
0-36 months 0.021∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.007
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
0-120 months 0.004∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
0-16 months −0.030∗∗∗
(0.004)
17-28 months 0.057∗∗∗
(0.006)
29-120 months −0.023∗∗∗
(0.007)
0-22 months 0.046∗∗∗
(0.006)
23-28 months −0.050∗∗∗
(0.005)
29-120 months 0.009
(0.007)
0-22 months −0.031∗∗∗
(0.007)
23-34 months 0.018∗∗
(0.007)
35-120 months 0.013∗
(0.008)
Observations 87,413 76,943 63,134
Notes: This Table is estimated on the matched and eligible sample of second
born with an older sibling born within a bandwidth of 24 months around the
policy reforms. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. This
table reports the 1{post policy reform} parameter estimate on the respective
age difference between first and second born child. All columns include
mother’s characteristic controls for 5 year age brackets, marital status, a
dummy for low SES (combined from educational and wage data) and a
foreign origin dummy.
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